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The implied human rights obligations of UNHCR 
Abstract 
Amongst the discourse surrounding the potential for non-State actors to hold human rights obligations 
are complex questions around what those rights entail, where they derive from and in what circumstances 
they apply. In an attempt to add clarity to that discussion, this article identifies the implied powers of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) as a potential catalyst for the creation of its 
human rights obligations. As a subsidiary body of the UN, UNHCR is imbued with the capacity to hold 
human rights obligations through attribution and derivative international legal personality, as well as via 
its status as an organisation to which the 'general rules of international law' apply. UNHCR has implied 
powers to administer refugee camps and conduct Refugee Status Determination (RSD). It is argued that 
when the 'quasi-sovereign' character of camp administration is considered in light of the particular 
vulnerability of refugees' human rights, their protection cannot be separated from camp administration or 
from the camp administrator itself, meaning that UNHCR has an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil 
the human rights of the inhabitants of the camps it administers. It is also argued that the unambiguous 
obligation for all parties that undertake RSD to respect non-refoulement, which is a human rights principle 
that is considered the 'cornerstone' of international protection, creates a concurrent obligation to ensure 
that RSD procedures are 'fair, efficient and effective'. Although the identification of rights obligations of 
non-State actors inevitably faces challenges from the lack of available remedies for individuals who seek 
liability for human rights breaches, as long as UNHCR undertakes activities that places it in direct contact 
with individuals, it is imperative that it retains limited human rights obligations that exist alongside of, and 
not in substitution for, those of States. 
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 1 
THE IMPLIED HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF UNHCR 
 
NIAMH KINCHIN* 
In an era of expanding global governance and diminishing importance of State 
sovereignty the ‘human rights conversation’ can no longer be confined to States’ 
capacity, obligations, and appetite for rights protection. It is hardly controversial to 
suggest that when non-State actors possess the capacity to affect human rights, the 
extent to which that actor should be accountable for their protection must be at the 
forefront of that conversation. Identifying what human rights obligations are 
applicable, from where those obligations derive and in what circumstances they are 
relevant however, is more contentious.  
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) is an agency that, as 
discussed in Part I, is capable of holding human rights obligations via its position as a 
subsidiary organ of the UN through attribution and derivative international legal 
personality. In addition, the ‘general rules of international law’ outlined in article 38 
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) apply to UNHCR to create a 
legal obligation to respect customary international law, which include human rights. 
However, which human rights UNHCR is obligated to protect, in what circumstances 
and the consequences of those obligations is not defined by the sources of its capacity 
for human rights obligations.   
In Part II, it is argued that UNHCR’s implied powers,1 which are those powers which, 
though not expressly provided in its constituent instrument, ‘are conferred upon it by 
necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties’
2
 create 
obligations for it to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of refugees in limited 
circumstances. The administration of refugee camps and the performance of refugee 
status determination (RSD), both of which are implied powers of UNHCR, contain 
                                                 
1
 Implied powers are: ‘[R]ead into the organization’s statute not in order to modify it or add to the 
members’ burdens, but in order to give effect to what they agreed by becoming parties to the 
constitutional treaty.’ K Skubiszewski, ‘Implied Powers of International Organizations’ in Y Dinstein 
(ed) International Law at a Time of Perplexity: Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne (Nijhoff 
Dordrecht 1989) 856. 
2
 Reparations for the Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (‘Reparations’) [1949] ICJ 
Rep 174, 182 (emphasis added). 
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obligations to protect human rights. When the ‘quasi sovereign’ character of camp 
administration is considered in light of the particular vulnerability of refugees, it is 
clear that the protection of their human rights cannot be separated from camp 
administration or the camp administrator, which is often UNHCR. Further, there is an 
obligation for all 
parties who undertake RSD, including UNHCR, to respect non-refoulement, which is 
the obligation to not expel or return a person to a country where their life or freedom 
would be threatened by persecution or torture and is considered the ‘cornerstone’ of 
international protection. As a consequence, a concurrent obligation is created to 
ensure that RSD procedures are fair, efficient and effective.  
Finally, in the Conclusion the lack of remedies for human rights violations is 
considered and potential ways forward suggested.   
 
I. DOES UNHCR HAVE THE CAPACITY TO HOLD HUMAN 
RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS?  
 
Sometimes the constitutions of International Organizations (IOs) or their subsidiary 
bodies expressly place a non-State actor within the framework of human rights. For 
example, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that established the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) declares that the High Commissioner 
shall: 
Function within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal 




‘Functioning within the framework’ of human rights instruments may be interpreted 
as an obligation to administer that framework or more expansively, to protect human 
rights because UNHCHR cannot function within a framework it is not bound by. 
Regardless, it is more common for constitutions of non-State actors to not expressly 
                                                 
* Lecturer, School of Law, Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts, University of Wollongong. I wish 
to acknowledge the helpful comments made by the anonymous reviewers. 
3




 plen mtg Doc/A/Res/48/141 [3(a)].  
 3 
create obligations relating to human rights. As a consequence, whether, and to what 
extent, non-State actors retain human rights obligations is yet to find international 
consensus,
4
 partly because obligations for human rights will differ for each actor. The 
extent of the human rights obligations of UNHCR, which is not formally bound by 
human rights instruments, is dependent on an enquiry that raises two questions. First, 
what are the sources of UNHCR’s capacity to hold human rights obligations? Second, 
if UNHCR is accountable for human rights protection, what is the nature of those 
rights and to whom are they due?  
 
1.1 Source of UNHCR’s Human Rights Obligations I: Position as a 
Subsidiary Organ of the UN 
 
UNHCR’s position as a UN subsidiary organ, which is confirmed by article 1 of its 
Statute,
5
 means that whilst UNHCR acts in a manner that can be described as 
somewhat independent, it cannot be separated from the UN as an organization. In 
particular, UNHCR facilitates the functions of the UNGA by adopting and carrying 
out its decisions. Further, UNHCR's tasks and functions are dependent on the scope of 
UNGA’s powers,
6
 meaning that it cannot be delegated more powers than UNGA 
possesses.
7
 As a consequence, UNHCR’s acts are not only attributable to the UN; it 
derives its international legal personality from it. Both attribution and international 
legal personality create obligations for UNHCR to protect the human rights of 
refugees in certain circumstances.  
 
                                                 
4
 Andrew Clapham describes the ‘old objections’ to imposing human rights obligations on non-state 
actors in A Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (OUP 2006) 33–56. See also G 
Giacca, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Armed Conflict (OUP 2014) 232-72 on the 
indeterminacy of the human rights obligations of armed non-state actors. 
5




 plen mtg, Doc/A/Res/428(v). UNHCR assumes the 
function of international protection ‘under the auspices of the United Nations’ and that it acts ‘under 
the authority of the General Assembly’. Accordingly, UNHCR is a subsidiary organ of the UN because 
it functions under its ‘auspices’ and acts under the authority of the UNGA, which itself is an organ of 
the UN.  
6
 C Felix Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations (2
nd
 ed CUP 
2003) 140–41. 
7
 H G Schermers, Blokker, N. M, International Institutional Law (5
th
 ed, Martinus Nijhoff 2011) 172-
73. The authors also point out that an IO cannot transfer its responsibility to a subsidiary organ. 
 4 
1.1.1 The Human Rights Obligations of the UN 
If UNHCR’s capacity to hold human rights obligations stem from its position as a UN 
subsidiary organ, then it follows that the UN must also have the capacity to hold 
human rights obligations. This proposition rests on four foundations. First, the UN is 
a subject of international law because it has international legal personality
8
 that is 
dependent upon its ‘purposes and functions as specified or implied in its constituent 
documents and developed in practice.’
9
 In the WHO Case the ICJ stated that 
‘international organizations are subjects of international law, and, as such, are bound 
by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, 
under their constitutions or under international agreements to which they are 
parties’.
10 
Article 38 of the ICJ Statute does not define what comprises ‘general rules 
of international law’ and whilst its human rights component continues to attract 
debate,
11
 it is largely accepted that it incorporates both jus cogens, which are 
peremptory norms from which no derogation is permitted,
12
 and laws that derive from 
custom.
13
 Accordingly, the UN will be bound by human rights obligations that are 
either customary international law or jus cogens.  
This argument encounters difficulty from the fact that the State is a fundamental 
component of customary international law, which makes any assertion that obligations 
are ‘incumbent’ upon the UN problematic. However, two factors point to an 
obligation for the UN to respect customary international law. First, the UN, as an 
organization, is considered a subject of international law whose 'duties depend upon 
its purposes and functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents and 
developed in practice'.
14
 Logically there is no impediment to the extension of its rights 
                                                 
8
 See G Verdirame, The UN and Human Rights: Who Guards the Guardians? (CUP 2011) 58-72 for the 
importance of legal personality to the human rights obligations of the UN. 
9
 Reparations [1949] ICJ Rep 174, 180.  
10
 Interpretation of the Agreement of March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt (‘WHO Case’) [1980] 
ICJ Rep 73, 89 – 90. Clapham (n 2) 9 states that ‘it is plain that international organizations have human 
rights obligations’ by citing The WHO Case.  
11
 A N Pronto, ‘‘Human-Rightism’ and the Development of General International Law’ (2007) 20 LJIL 
753. 
12
 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 
1980) 1155 UNTS 331, art 53.  
13
 See M T Kamminga, ‘Final Report on the Impact of International Human Rights Law on General 
International Law’ in M T Kamminga and M Scheinin (eds) Final Report on the Impact of 
International Human Rights Law on General International Law (OUP 2009). 
14
 Reparations (n 7) 180. 
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and duties to customary international law where they relate to its functions and 
purposes as specified or implied in its constituent documents and developed in 
practice. Second, although the UN does not officially contribute to the formation of 
customary international law
15
 its actions can be viewed as evidence of opinio juris 
and State practice. UNGA resolutions and other non-binding statements from IOs may 
be evidence of opinio juris where they receive endorsement from States.
16
 Opinio 
juris is the first element of customary international law and according to the ‘human 
rights method’ of identification, the primary element.
17
 In addition, treaties, rules and 
the decisions of the judicial organs of IOs are generally considered to be capable of 
contributing to State practice.
18
  Contribution to customary international law may not 
necessarily bind an organization, but it gives weight to the proposition that IOs are 
bound by customary international law as principles of general international law. As 
Verdirame argues, it would be ‘extremely disruptive for the international system to 
tolerate the presence of actors that are endowed with legal personality, and thus with 
the legal capacity to operate upon the international plane, but are exempt form a body 
of universally or almost universally accepted rules.’
19
 
The second foundation for the UN’s capacity to hold human rights obligations are 
circumstances where it is involved in peacekeeping duties and/or the temporary 
administration of a territory,
20
 which are operations that are undertaken as part of the 
UN Security Council’s (UNSC) responsibilities for international peace and security.
21
 
                                                 
15
 M Janmyr Protecting Civilians in Refugee Camps (Martinus Nijhoff 2014) 236; Giacca (n 2) 237. 
16
 The ICJ has stated that ‘opinio juris may… be deduced from, inter alia, the attitude of the Parties and 
the attitude of States towards certain UNGA resolutions (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua (‘Nicaragua Case’)[1986] ICJ Rep 14, 188) and that resolutions ‘can, in certain 
circumstances, provide evidence important for establishing the existence of… the emergence of an 
opinio juris’ (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 
226, 70.  
17
 J Wouters and C Ryngaert, ‘Impact on the Process of the Formation of Customary International Law’ 
in M T Kamminga and M Scheinin (eds) Final Report on the Impact of International Human Rights 
Law on General International Law (OUP 2009) 111-31. 
18
 J Klabbers and A Wallendahl, Research Handbook on the Law of International Organizations 
(Edward Elgar 2011) 207.  
19
 Verdirame (n 6) 71. 
20
 The International Law Association (ILA) recommends that the human rights and humanitarian law 
applicable to the activities of IOs include basic human rights obligations in the temporary 
administration of territory and peace keeping and enforcement activities. International Law Association 
Third Report Consolidated, Revised and Enlarged Version of Recommended Rules and Practices 
(RRP’s) New Dehli Conference 2002, 12. 
21
 See United Nations Peacekeeping, ‘Mandates and the legal basis for peacekeeping’ 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/pkmandates.shtml for discussion on the legal mandate 
of the UN to undertake peacekeeping operations.  
 6 
It has been argued that when the UN temporarily administers a territory, such as in 
East Timor from 1999–2002 and in Kosovo from 1999 (albeit in a limited capacity 
since 2008), it acts as a ‘quasi-sovereign’ because it has complete responsibility for 
the administration of that territory, including civil and security matters.
22
 The 
breakdown of a State’s governance and national security leaves a human rights 
‘vacuum’ so that the more the UN emulates a State, the more fully human rights 
obligations apply to it.
23
 Augmenting this argument is the assertion that the UN has 
the same human rights obligations as the State in which it operates, regardless of 
whether they arise from customary international law or treaties.
24
 When the UN takes 
on quasi-sovereign status, the human rights obligations of the administered State 
remain in force throughout the administration and ‘may be said to be binding by 
reasoning of established principles of the law of state succession.’
25
 For example, 
although the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 
had effective control/administration of Kosovo since 1999, it is arguable that the 
human rights obligations of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia remained in force 
whilst that State still existed because, as the Human Rights Committee (HRC) has 
stated, ‘once the people are accorded the protection of the rights under the Covenant, 
such protection devolves with territory and continues to belong to them, 
notwithstanding change in government of the State party, including dismemberment 
in more than one State or State succession.’
26
 Similarly, the UN has agreed to ‘respect 
all local laws and regulations’ as part of its peace-keeping operations,
27
 meaning that 
it is arguable that where the local State is a signatory to, and therefore bound by a 
human rights instrument, UN peace keeping personnel are similarly bound.
28
  
                                                 
22 F Megret and F Hoffman, ‘The UN as a Human Rights Violator?: Some Reflections on the United 
Nations Changing Human Rights Responsibilities’ (2003) 25 HumRtsQ 316. A Slaughter and J Crisp, 
‘A Surrogate State? The role of UNHCR in Protected Refugee Situations’ (Research paper No. 168, 
UNHCR, January 2009) 8. 
23 Ibid 314, 323. 
24
 I Bantekas and L Oette, International Human Rights Law and Practice (CUP 2013) 678. 
25
 P M Dupont, ‘Detention of Individuals During Peacekeeping Operations: Lessons Learned from 
Kosovo’ in R Arnold & G A Knoops (eds), Practice and Policies of Modern Peace Support Operations 
Under International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2006) 249, 256.  
26
 UN Human Rights Comm, General Comment No. 26: Continuity of obligations 4, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/Cl2l1Rev.1/Add.81Rev.1 (8 Dec 1997). 
27
 The Secretary General, Draft Model Status of Forces Agreement/or Peace-keeping Operations, 37, 
UN Doc. A/45/594 (9 Oct 1990) [art 6]. 
28
 T Dannenbaum, ‘Translating the Standard of Effective Control into a System of Effective 
Accountability: How Liability Should be Appropriated for Violations of Human Rights by Member 
State Troop Contingents Serving as United Nations Peacekeepers’ (2010) 51 HarvIntlLJ 113, 138. 
 7 
The third human rights foundation is the obligations that arise from the UN Charter. 
In the Administrative Tribunal Case
29
 the ICJ found that the UN had an implied 
power to establish an administrative tribunal under article 7(2) of its Charter. The 
Court claimed that power to establish the tribunal was essential to ‘give effect to the 
paramount consideration of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence 
and integrity’ and that ‘capacity to do this arises by necessary intendment out of the 
Charter’.
30
 By linking the need for a tribunal to the Charter, the Court created an 
obligation for the UN to create the tribunal, not just an authority to do so. The 
preamble of the UN Charter states that one of its purposes is to ‘reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights’. Article 1(3) of the Charter states that the purpose of the 
UN is to ‘promote and encourage respect for human rights’ and article 55(c) states 
that the UN shall promote ‘universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion.’ If the creation of an administrative tribunal can be conceptualized as an 
obligation that is based upon the purpose of the Charter, it could be argued that an 
obligation to protect human rights arises as a necessary intendment out of the Charter 
because a failure to protect human rights is incongruous with an objective to promote 
them.
31
  It is acknowledged that whilst the UN has authority to take action to create a 
tribunal as a subsidiary organ under article 7(2), no similar authority exists to take 
direct action regarding human rights protection. However, it is difficult to conceive 
how a body that is tasked to promote human rights, and declares that its own 
personnel is to act in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR),
32
 has no need to protect those human rights itself.
33
 
The fourth foundation of the UN’s human rights obligations is a simple one. The UN 
is an international organization that is made up of member states, which means that it 
                                                 
29
 Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal (Advisory 
Opinion) (‘Administrative Tribunal Case’) [1954] ICJ Rep, 47. 
30
 Administrative Tribunal Case ibid, 47, 57. Cf ‘The WHO Case’ (n 8) where the court expressed 
concern that finding that agencies of the UN had wide implied powers would break down the division 
of powers between UN and its agencies, undermining the court’s concept of the UN  as a system. 
31
 Megret and Hoffman (n 20) 317 suggest that the UN ‘is bound by international human rights 
standards as a result of being tasked to promote them by its own internal and constitutional legal order, 
without any added judicial finesse’.  
32
 Clapham (n 2) 127 points out that the UN’s Code of Conduct for Peacekeepers and the Handbook for 
Military Observers and Civilian Police state that personnel are to act in accordance with the UDHR.  
33
 See J Paust, ‘The U.N. Is Bound By Human Rights: Understanding the Full Reach of Human Rights, 
Remedies, and Nonimmunity (2010) 51 HarvIntlLJ 301. 
 8 
is bound ‘transitively’ by human rights as a result and to the extent that its members 
are bound.
34
 States do not relinquish their human rights obligations when an IO takes 
action on their behalf.
35
 In M & Co v Federal Republic of Germany the European 
Commission of Human Rights found that the transfer of State powers to an IO is valid 
only when the protection of fundamental human rights by that IO is equivalent to the 
standards that States would ordinarily be bound under the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR).
36
 This ‘doctrine of equivalent protection’ may, in time, have 
relevance for the UN.  
 
1.1.2 The Subsidiary Human Rights Obligations of UNHCR 
UNHCR’s human rights obligations do not exist separately from the UN.
37
 This 
proposition finds support in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), which has declared that internationally wrongful acts that are committed by 
one of the UN’s subsidiary organs are attributable to the UN.
38
 As discussed above, 
when the UN or one of its subsidiary organs temporarily administers a territory it does 
so as a de jure administrator, which means it is given a formal mandate in the form of 
a UNSC resolution and/or as part of a treaty, to administer the territory.
39
 In Behrami 
the ECtHR found that the actions
40
 of the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) and UNMIK 
were attributable to NATO and the UN as their subsidiary organs because the UN and 
NATO had ‘effective control’ of the territory.
41
 The significance of the Behrami 
decision for the human rights obligations of UNHCR is not in relation to issues of 
territorial administration however, it is in the court’s finding that ‘UNMIK was a 
                                                 
34 Megret and Hoffman (n 20) 318. See also Bantekas and Oette (n 21). 
35
 The International Law Commissions (ILC) Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, November 2001, Supplement No 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1, art 5.  
36
 M & Co v Federal Republic of Germany App No 13258/87 (Commission Decision, 9 Feb 1990). See 
also Bosphorous Hava Yollari Turizm v Ireland App no 45036/98 (ECtHR 30 June 2005) 155. 
European Convention on Human Rights formally known as Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) 213 UNTS 222.  
37
 The nature of UNHCR’s human rights obligations are not identical to that of the UN. Instead, 
UNHCR’s human rights obligations are dictated by its objectives and functions. 
38
 Behrami and Behrami v France and Seramati v France, Germany and Norway App No 71412/01 
and App No, 78166/01 (ECtHR, 2 May 2007) (‘Behrami’). 
39
 Verdirame (n 6) 230. 
40
 A failure to detonate mines and false imprisonment. 
41
 Behrami (n 34) 128-143. Effective control’ is the exercise of public functions (legislative, executive 
or judicial) in a way that amounts to territorial control. ibid 233-35. 
 9 
subsidiary organ of the UN institutionally directly and fully answerable to the UNSC’ 
and ‘that UNMIK was a subsidiary organ of the UN created under Chapter VII of the 
Charter so that the impugned inaction was, in principle, “attributable” to the UN in 
the same sense.’
42
 In other words, if the conduct of a subsidiary organ, such as 
UNHCR, can be attributable to the UN, and the UN is bound by an international 
obligation, then that body is capable of violating that international obligation qua its 
position as a subsidiary organ. The UN Legal Counsel has supported this 
interpretation of the court’s finding by stating: 
As a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, an act of a peacekeeping force is, in 
principle, imputable to the Organization, and if committed in violation of an 
international obligation entails the international responsibility of the Organization and 
its liability in compensation.
43
 
Whilst the Behrami decision relied upon the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
International Organizations (DARIO)
44
 (since updated to the Articles on the 
Responsibility of International Organizations (ARIO)) to inform its usage of the term 
‘attribution’, ARIO does not assist in defining what constitutes an international 
obligation. ARIO does not create international obligations;  it refers to obligations that 
are attributable to the IO, which are created by other instruments and rules of 
international law.
45
 Whilst ‘when and which’ human rights obligations bind the UN as 
international obligations remains open, where UN’s international obligations can be 
identified as having a human rights character, UNHCR inherits those same obligations 
through attribution. 
The second way that UNHCR ‘inherits’ human rights obligations via its status as a 
UN subsidiary organ is through international legal personality. UNHCR derives 
international legal personality, which is compatible with its objectives and functions, 
                                                 
42
 ibid 142-43. 
43
 Unpublished letter of 3 February 2004 by the UN Legal Counsel to the Director of the Codification 
Division, quoted in ILC Report (2004) UN Doc A/59/10, 112. Verdirame (n 6) 199-200. 
44
 The Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO), Official Records 
of the General Assembly, Sixty-sixth session, Supplement No. 10 UN Doc A/66/10 (3 June 2011), 
create responsibility for an IO committing a ‘wrongful act’, which is defined as an act or omission that 
is attributable to an IO under international law and constitutes a breach of an international obligation 
for that organizations (art 4).  
45
 See Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (ARIO) Sixtysixth sess, agenda 




  Although the ICJ was referring to the UN when it declared that ‘the 
rights and duties of … the Organization must depend upon its purposes and functions 
as specified or implied in its constituent documents and developed in practice’,
47
 the 
court established that non-State actors may possess some international legal 
personality but only to the extent of the ‘function they are to fulfil in that legal 
order’,
48
 or to the extent that States as the subjects of international law confer on 
them. The purpose and functions that can be implied from constituent documents and 
subsequent practice will depend on the particular organization, but they must be 
conferred by reasonable implication ‘as capacities required to enable the 
organizationss to discharge their functions effectively.’
49
 The ICJ has confirmed this 
approach in subsequent cases.
50
  
Although it has been argued that UNHCR has international legal personality simply 
by virtue of being an IO,
51
 even a more narrow approach (i.e. that UNHCR has only 
that degree of international legal personality that is conferred on it by the UN
52
) 
establishes its capacity to hold human rights obligations. As human rights obligations 
are a component of the UN’s international legal personality, those obligations will 
flow from the UN to UNHCR, albeit in a way that is dictated by the objectives and 
functions of UNHCR, which, as discussed in Part II, relate to the protection of 
refugees.  
 
1.2 Source of UNHCR’s Human Rights Obligations II: General Rules of 
International Law 
 
                                                 
46
 Verdirame (n 6) 62. 
47
 Reparations (n 7) 180. 
48
 ibid.  
49
 Amerasinghe (n 4) 102. 
50
 See eg., Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Article 2, of the Charter) (Advisory 
Opinion) [1962] ICJ Rep 151, 167; Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (Mazilu Case) (Advisory Opinion) [1989] ICJ Rep 
177, 195–97. 
51
 Janmyr (n 13) 229-30. 
52
 G Gilbert, ‘Rights, Legitimate Expectations, Needs and Responsibilities: UNHCR and the New 
World Order’ (1998) 10 IJRL 350, 358. An alternative view is that there is no implication that 
UNHCR’s legal personality must necessarily be narrower than that of the UN. F Green, 
‘Fragmentation in Two Dimensions: The ICJ’s Flawed Approach to Non-State Actors and International 
Legal Personality’ (2008) Melbourne Journal of International Law 47, 72.  
 11 
If ‘international organizations are … bound by any obligations incumbent upon them 
under general rules of international law…’
53
 UNHCR will be bound by virtue of 
being an IO, rather than through its status as a subsidiary organ of the UN.  
The definition of an IO is evolving beyond its traditional understanding as an 
organization formed by a multi-lateral treaty.
54
 The International Law Commission 
(ILC) has described IOs as bodies that are established by treaty or other instruments 
that are governed by international law, and which possess their own legal 
personality.
55
 This definition includes organizationss that have been created by 
‘instruments, such as resolutions adopted by the UNGA or by a conference of 
States.’
56
 Amerasinghe defines an IO as a body that possesses five identifying 
characteristics; that it should be established by some kind of international agreement 
by States, that it possess a constitution, that it will possess organs that are separate 
from its members, that it is established under international law and finally, that it will 
have an exclusive or predominant membership of State or governments.
57
 
Amerasinghe further argues that international personality, along with treaty-making 
capacity, are not intrinsic to the definition of an IO.
58
  
Although not created by treaty,
59
 UNHCR was established according to international 
law by a UNGA resolution. UNHCR’s constitution is its mandate, which includes 
both its Statute and UNGA resolutions. Although UNHCR does not have members 
that are separate from the UN's members, those members are exclusively States. 
Regardless of whether legal personality is required by an IO, UNHCR derives legal 
personality from the UN that is compatible with its objectives and functions.
60
 As 
discussed above, general international law contains customary international law and 
the rules of customary international law that create human rights obligations for 
UNHCR are the subject of Part II. 
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II UNHCR’S IMPLIED POWERS AS A SOURCE OF ITS HUAMN 
RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS  
 
As an IO understood in the broad sense outlined above, UNHCR has the capacity for 
implied powers.
61
 As an organization with the capacity for human rights obligations, 
it is argued that two of these powers, the administration of refugee camps and RSD, 
carry obligations to adhere to certain human rights standards.  
 
2.1 The Administration of Refugee Camps and RSD as Implied Powers of 
UNHCR 
 
Implied powers of an institution are additional (but not ‘new’62) powers to those that 
are expressed in a body’s constituent instrument. In Reparations, the ICJ defined 
implied powers in the following way: 
Under international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those powers 
which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by 
necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties.
63
  
Keeping to one side controversies around the breadth of this definition and whether it 
should be confined to those powers that are necessarily implied by the powers 
expressly granted in an IO's constitution,
64
 if UNHCR has powers that are necessarily 
implied as being essential to the performance of its duties, then it is essential that it 
have the ability to define and adopt measures to ‘achieve the object and purpose of 
supervising the international framework governing refugee protection’.
65
 Considering 
that ‘sovereign States have the primary responsibility for respecting and ensuring the 
                                                 
61
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fundamental rights of everyone within their territory and subject to their 
jurisdiction’,
66
 the powers of UNHCR that can be necessarily implied are those that 
are essential to either the facilitation by UNHCR of protection by States, or the direct 
protection of refugees where States will not or cannot, provide protection. Examples 
of the latter, which are the focus of this article, are the powers to administer refugee 
camps and carry out RSD.  
UNHCR’s Statute enables UNHCR to undertake ‘additional activities’, which are to 
be determined by the UNGA.
67
 Accordingly, UNHCR’s statute expressly allows for 
implied powers, the only stipulation being that their nature is to be ‘determined’ by 
the UNGA. In practice it has primarily been UNHCR that has identified the additional 
activities that it needs to fulfil its mandate responsibility for international protection. 
UNHCR's 1994 Note on International Protection (‘Protection Note’) states that these 
functions include ‘securing admission, asylum, and respect for basic human rights, 
including the principle of non-refoulement’, durable solutions and the promotion of 
legislation to ‘ensure that refugees are identified and accorded an appropriate status 
and standard of treatment in their countries of asylum’, amongst other things.
68  
UNHCR’s 2000 Protection Note separates its international protection functions into 
four ‘principal protection challenges’, which are (a) ensuring the availability and 
quality of asylum; (b) revitalizing the refugee protection system; (c) promoting 
durable solutions from a protection perspective and engaging in in-country protection 
activities; and (d) fostering partnerships in support of the international refugee 
protection system. The note outlines operational activities to strengthen asylum, 
which includes ‘receiving asylum-seekers and refugees’, ‘intervening with 
authorities’, ‘ensuring physical safety’, ‘protecting women, children and the elderly’, 
‘promoting national legislation and asylum procedures’, ‘participating in national 
refugee status determination procedures’, ‘undertaking determination of refugee 





More recently, UNHCR defined some its ‘standard functions’ as 
                                                 
66
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including ‘relief distribution, emergency preparedness, special humanitarian activities, 
broader development work, as well as registration, determination of status and issuance of 
documentation for persons falling under the mandate.’
70 
 
Although, unlike RSD, the administration of refugee camps is not identified as a 
separate protection activity, activities associated with camp administration are 
referred to in relation to other operational activities. For example, the 2000 Protection 
Note refers to the importance of ensuring physical safety of refugees within camps
71
 
and taking measures to protect women, children and the elderly within camps, giving 
the example of establishing women’s centres in a number of camps.
72
 Further, the 
UNGA endorses UNHCR’s interpretation of its operational duties when it expressly 
refers to those activities as belonging to UNHCR.
73
  
The administration of refugee camps and RSD are implied powers of UNHCR 
because they are activities that are essential to its international protection function 
when States cannot or will not comply with their protection obligations under 
international refugee law. Where a State refuses to take on formal protection 
responsibilities, or cannot do so due to poverty or internal conflict, there is a gap 
between the rights conferred by the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(‘Refugee Convention’)
74
 and the duty to protect those rights, which causes a 
‘protection vacuum’.
75
 In certain situations UNHCR must possess the ability to 
provide that protection itself, the authority to do so being necessarily implied from its 
international protection function.  
Two issues regarding this argument are acknowledged. First, UNHCR’s power to 
undertake these activities is contingent on permission being granted by States to 
operate within their territory. Accordingly, whilst UNHCR may have an implied 
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power to undertake these activities, it may not be able to do so if it has not been 
issued an invitation to operate within the State’s territory. Second, an implied power 
to undertake protection activities is a power and not an obligation. Whilst Verdirame 
argues that obligations can equally be implied into a constituent instrument 
(advocating for the alternative ‘implied terms’)
76
 it is important that UNHCR’s ability 
to undertake protection activities is perceived as a power to ensure that it is not 
burdened with new protection obligations that it was never intended to have. This, 
however, does not mean that UNHCR's implied powers cannot contain obligations to 
exercise the power in accordance with broadly-accepted aspirations, such as human 
rights protection. Once UNHCR has committed to undertaking these activities, they 
become part of its relationship with refugees and are the catalyst for the identification 
of its human rights obligations.  
 
2.2  Protecting Human Rights in Refugee Camps 
 
An obligation for UNHCR to adhere to human rights standards is inherent to its 
administration of refugee camps.  
Although protection of refugees remains the responsibility of States, in some 
circumstances such as where there has been a mass influx of refugees and a 
subsequent protracted refugee situation, States have often taken on a limited role in 
camp administration. The reasons for this are varied but include a reluctance to 
expend national resources on a growing number of displaced people, the changing 
nature of conflict from external to internal aggression, a growing sense by developing 
countries that they are being burdened by a disproportionate number of refugees
77
 and 
a general shift in an international mindset, which dates from the 1980s, from 
accommodation of refugees to control of their intake.
78
 More often, it is a matter of 
lack of resources. The large Dadaab camps in Kenya (Dagahaley, Hagadera, Ifo, Ifo 2 
and Kambioos), which were established following the breakdown of governance in 
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Somalia in 1991, are an example of camps where the State, Kenya, was both unable 
and unwilling to undertake complete administration of the camps and according to 




In conjunction with its NGO implementing partners,
80
 UNHCR is responsible for the 
de facto administration of refugee camps. De facto administration means that the 
administrating authority does not have a formal mandate in the form of a UNSC 
resolution and/or as part of a treaty to administer the territory.
81
   This does not mean, 
however, that UNHCR is operating within the territory of a State without its 
permission. Camp administration is formalised by an agreement between UNHCR 
and the host State,
82
 which outlines the broad expectations of both parties, including 
the role of UNHCR in assisting governments in the protection of refugees and the 
State in providing the facilities and resources for UNHCR to carry out its work, as 
well as to ensure immunities and protection for UNHCR staff.
83
  
Refugees’ human rights are common with and additional to those held by the general 
population.
84
 As the primary instrument for international protection, article 7 of the 
Refugee Convention provides that, except where the Refugee Convention contains 
more favourable provisions, all refugees should be accorded the same treatment that 
normally applies to ‘aliens’. Although States have traditionally been considered to 
bestow human rights on individuals through the ratification of a treaty, a State’s 
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commitment to pacta sunt servanda
85
 is enough to allow individuals to benefit from 
those rights assigned to them,
86
 meaning that refugees, ‘along with aliens, are entitled 
to claim the protection and benefit of any human rights treaties that the State, on 




Some rights protected by human rights treaties are particular to refugees, including 
the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.
88
 The 
Refugee Convention confers a number of rights on refugees, which include the right 
not to be refouled,
89
 the right not to be discriminated against in the application of the 
Refugee Convention,
90










 and religious freedom.
95
 Although the Refugee Convention is not as 
comprehensive in regard to civil and socio-economic rights as the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Convention on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),
96
 James Hathaway argues the 
inability of States to make reservations to such rights as discrimination, religious 
freedom and refoulement ‘entrenches a universal minimum guarantee of basic 
liberties for refugees’.
97
 Where refugees reside in States that are not signatories to the 
Refugee Convention the protection of refugees’ rights is provided by international 
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protection by UNHCR and the binding character of non-refoulement as a customary 
rule of international law.
98
  
Although human rights instruments and customary international law are applicable to 
refugees within and outside of refugee camps,
99
 the refugee camp model has received 
criticism for enabling the violation of human rights. Verdirame argues that refugee 
camps are inherently incompatible with international human rights law and are 
therefore ultra vires
100
 because their existence infringes the right to ‘freedom of 
movement’, which is protected by article 26 of the Refugee Convention and article 12 
of the ICCPR. Marjoleine Ziek points to the protracted nature of refugee situations, 
and the related phenomenon of ‘warehousing’ of refugees as creating a situation 
where ‘many refugees spend one, two, three or more decades in camps without such 
basic human rights as freedom of movement, protection from violence, and the right 
to support their families.’
101
 Verdirame draws upon field research from the Dadaab 
camps to present examples of breaches of other human rights such as freedom of 




 and the right to an adequate 
standard of living, which is a violation of article 11 of the ICESR.
104
 If UNHCR has a 
capacity to hold human rights obligations and an implied power to administer refugee 
camps, is UNHCR accountable for the protection of the human rights of the 
inhabitants of those camps?  
Ralph Wilde argues that UNHCR’s human rights obligations within refugee camps are 
based upon the agreement between UNHCR and the host country to conduct 
humanitarian and asylum-related activities within the latter’s jurisdiction. Wilde 
claims that a Model Agreement has the effect of the host country transferring its 
obligations to protect human rights by delegating its international legal personality to 
                                                 
98
 UNHCR, ‘Providing for Protection Assisting States with the assumption of responsibility for refugee 
status determination: A preliminary review’ PDES/2014/01 March 2014, [47]. 
99
 See The Secretary General, ‘Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Special Measures for Protection from 
Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse’ UN Doc. ST/ SGB/2003/13 (Oct 9, 2003). See also UNHCR, 
‘Minimum Standards and Essential Needs in a Protracted Refugee Situation: A Review of the UNHCR 
Program in Kakuma, Kenya’ 39-40, UN Doc EPAU/2000/05 (Nov 2000). 
100
 Verdirame (n 6) 232. 
101
 M Ziek, ‘UNHCR’s Parallel Universe: Marking the Contours of a Problem’ (Speech Delivered at 
the Amsterdam Law School, University of Amsterdam, 23 April 2010) 2. 
102
 Verdirame (n 6) 286. 
103
 ibid 288. 
104
 ibid 292. 
 19 
UNHCR to the extent that it is relevant to UNHCR’s purposes and functions.
105
 
According to Wilde, ‘the degree to which international law can apply to UNHCR's 
governance is inextricably linked to international law's influence on the sovereign 
entity.’
106
 If the State were to conduct the kind of activities that UNHCR undertakes 
within its jurisdiction, such as administering refugee camps, it would be bound by its 
human rights obligations in respect of those activities. As UNHCR is undertaking 
these activities on its behalf, the State confers UNHCR with the relevant international 
legal personality - being its own human rights obligations.  
There are two difficulties with Wilde’s argument. First, it relies on the proposition that 
the State confers its international legal personality to UNHCR through a Model 
Agreement. Whilst Reparations found that member States clothed the UN with the 
competence required to enable the functions entrusted to it to be effectively 
discharged,
107
 that ‘clothing of competence’ was a result of a binding treaty in 
international law (i.e. the UN Charter). It is difficult to see how a Model Agreement 
might have the same effect. UNHCR has not been entrusted with functions by the host 
State but has merely been given permission to exercise its functions within its 
jurisdiction. In addition, there is no clear ICJ authority on the direct transferal of 
international legal personality from States to the subsidiary organs of the UN. 
Although this does not mean that such an argument cannot succeed, without that 
authority it is a more convincing proposition to argue, as earlier in this article, that 
UNHCR is conferred its international legal personality from the UN as its parent 
organization.   
Second, a State cannot contract out its obligations. Only a State can be held liable for 
the violation of human rights instruments. Although article 2(1) of the ICCPR states 
that State parties to the Convention undertake to ‘respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant …’ the Human Rights Commission, confirming Article 5 of the 
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 Reparations (n 7) 180. 
108
 Article 5, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts states; 
Conduct of persons or entities exercising elements of governmental authority 
The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State under article 4 but which is 
 
 20 
stated that the article does not imply that a State cannot be held accountable where 
one of its ‘agents’ commits a violation of its obligations under human rights 
instruments inside the territory of another State.
109
 A State cannot avoid liability for 
human rights obligations because an agent (ie. an IO) is ‘sub-contracted’ to act for it 
in an extraterritorial capacity. Indeed, the State could be held responsible if the IO 




It is well supported by the ICJ that when a State exerts ‘effective control’ over another 
territory, human rights obligations apply. In Namibia, the ICJ held that ‘[t]he fact that 
South Africa no longer has any title to administer the territory does not release it from 
its obligations and responsibilities under international law …’
111
 Further, it is arguable 
that the human rights obligations of an administered State remain in force whilst that 
State exists because, as the HRC has stated, ‘once the people are accorded the 
protection of the rights under the Covenant, such protection devolves with territory 
and continues to belong to them, notwithstanding change in government of the State 
party, including dismemberment in more than one State or State succession.’
112
 
Although these issues relate to de jure rather than de facto administration, if both an 
administering and administered State can retain human rights obligations in certain 
circumstances, it is difficult to conceive how a State that is subject to a limited de 
facto administration in the form of refugee camp administration can be said to transfer 
its human rights obligations to that authority via its international legal personality.  
UNHCR's accountability for human rights protections in the context of refugee camps 
should not rely on the host State’s human rights obligations except to the point they 
are diminished, practically if not theoretically. In such circumstances, UNHCR’s 
human rights obligations act to fill in the protection vacuum created. Refugee 
populations are the responsibility of their host nation, but where refugee camps exist 
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it is UNHCR, which, with the assistance of partner organizationss and States, 
commonly assumes their administration. When a refugee camp is primarily 
administered by an organization other than the host State, the nature of the activities 
undertaken puts that organization into the position of ‘micro-sovereignty’
113
 or a 
‘surrogate state’.
114
 Whilst some activities may be provided by the host State, such as 
security/law and order services provided by the Kenyan government for example, and 
whilst UNHCR may rely on those States to provide those services,
115
 they do not 
detract from the fact that UNHCR is the primary administrator. 
The camp administration activities undertaken by UNHCR in conjunction with its 
NGO implementing partners resemble those provided by States. As camp 
administrator, UNHCR undertakes functions that include registering refugees and 
providing them with personal documentation, ‘ensuring that they have access to 
shelter, food, water, health care and education’, and ‘establishing policing and justice 
mechanisms’,
116
 including the provision of security personnel and services.
117
 In 
addition, UNHCR is responsible for long-term ‘care and maintenance’ programmes 
within camps. ‘Care and maintenance’ is defined as ‘assistance to refugees in a 
relatively stable situation, where survival is no longer threatened, but where future of 
the refugee group has not yet been determined in terms of durable solutions.’
118
 
Slaughter and Crisp describe the care and maintenance model as creating: 
a widespread perception that the organization [UNHCR] was a surrogate state, 
complete with its own territory (refugee camps), citizens (refugees), public services 
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It is argued that as an organization with direct engagement with individuals and 
groups who are protected by human rights,
120
 UNHCR must respect, protect and fulfil 
the human rights of the inhabitants of the camps it administers.
121
 UNHCR identifies 
the importance of a ‘rights based approach’ in operational camps and settlements
122
 
and acknowledges that it ‘has a global mandate to ensure that the human rights of its 
beneficiaries are upheld in accordance with the international obligations of States 
hosting them.’
123
 Although an IO’s obligations to ‘protect and fulfil’ human rights 
may be contested,
124
 it is argued that the particular vulnerability of refugees in camps, 
the role of UNHCR in the provision of fundamental goods, services and overall 
governance, and the diminished role of host States, means that UNHCR has a duty to 
protect and fulfil the human rights of refugees within the camps that it administers to 
the ‘extent that their functions allow them to fulfil such a duty’.
125
 This duty arises 
from its own human rights obligations and not those of States. UNHCR’s role in 
overseeing the provision of humanitarian aid and taking on the responsibility of ‘care 
and maintenance’ in lieu of the host State means it is not only accountable for the 
respect and protection of human rights, it must fulfil them by providing services and 
developing strategies to build capacities that ensure their human rights are met.
126
  
UNHCR’s implied power to administer refugee camps cannot be separated from an 
obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of the individuals and groups 
residing within refugee camps. Whilst this obligation may not rely upon binding 
international instrumentality, it forms part of UNHCR’s wider role of international 
protection.  
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2.3  Non-refoulement, RSD and Procedural Standards 
Responsibility for RSD lies with States.
127
 However, where States abdicate their 
protection duties, which primarily occurs when a State lacks the resources and 
capacity to carry out RSD, or where a host State is not a signatory to the Refugee 
Convention but hosts a large number of refugees, UNHCR has little choice but to 
conduct RSD itself. The fact that UNHCR is a substitute decision maker with 
significant resource and capacity restraints
128
 does not justify a weaker application of 
procedural standards by UNHCR. The need to respect the human rights principle of 
non-refoulement creates an obligation for UNHCR to meet the same procedural 
standards in RSD as States. It is argued that these standards are, at a minimum, that 
RSD be fair, efficient and effective. 
UNHCR’s RSD applies to what are known as ‘mandate refugees’. In contrast to RSD 
conducted by States, a mandate refugee is determined by the definition of a refugee 
outlined in UNHCR’s Statute,
129
 which is similar, but not identical to the Refugee 
Convention’s definition of a refugee. A person who meets the criteria for a refugee in 
UNHCR’s Statute will qualify for protection by UNHCR, regardless of whether he or 
she is within the territory of a party to the Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, or 
whether he or she has been recognised as a refugee under the Refugee Convention.
130
 
UNHCR may also apply broader regional refugee definitions in Africa and Latin 
America,
131
 or as a result of an UNGA resolution in a given situation
132
 or under 
complementary protection criteria. 
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In 2014, UNHCR was responsible, or jointly responsible for RSD in 68 countries and 
received 245,600 new and appeal applications for asylum or refugee status.
133
  In the 
same period UNHCR made 99,600 substantive decisions, which included convention 
status decisions, complementary protection and rejections.
134
  
For RSD to be consistent with the principles of international protection, one of its 
primary objectives must be respect for non-refoulement.
135
 Non-refoulement is both 
central to the concept of international protection and a human right. Non-refoulement 
was included in the Refugee Convention by article 33(1), which was based upon 
previous State practice and international agreements
136
 and created a binding State 
obligation not to refoule refugees unless one of the national security or crime 
exception circumstances in article 33(2) applies. The application of non-refoulement 
has been given wider application by its inclusion in various instruments of 
international and human rights law
137
 and is widely accepted to have gained the 
requisite character of customary international law.
138
 It has also been suggested that 
non-refoulement has evolved beyond customary international law and treaty law to 
achieve the status of jus cogens.
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 ibid 55. 
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 ‘Refugee status determination (RSD) is perhaps the single most important means of securing 
international protection for those men, women and children who are in need of it. A faulty 
determination may result in the refoulement of refugees and the denial of rights to which they are 
entitled. Providing for Protection (n 94) 69. 
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 UNHCR EXCOM Conclusion No. 25 (XXXIII) (1982) par (b); Cartagena Declaration, 22 
November 1984, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OAS Doc. 
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States and UNHCR are bound to respect non-refoulement as the cornerstone of 
international protection and as RSD is the practical means, or the ‘entry point’
140
 
through which a person becomes entitled to protection, it follows that procedurally 
sufficient RSD is a vital defence against the risk of refoulement.
141
 UNHCR 
acknowledges this when it states that, ‘respect for the principle of non-refoulement 
can therefore be most effectively ensured if claims to refugee status and asylum are 
determined substantively and expeditiously.’
142
 If RSD outcomes are substantively 
accurate, the risk of non-refoulement is significantly diminished.
143
 The likelihood of 
substantive accuracy of RSD is lessened if procedural standards are not in place to 
provide a system of checks and balances on the decision-making process.
144
 
Procedural standards encourage more stringent justification for findings on facts and 
lessen the likelihood of bias in the decision-making process. Most importantly, they 
provide an effective remedy in the form of review.  
For States, RSD procedural standards are shaped by domestic accountability 
mechanisms provided for by administrative law, such as regulation and administrative 
tribunals, as well as domestic and international judicial opinion, UNHCR’s policy 
guides and handbooks and the Conclusions of the Executive Committee of the High 
Commissioner’s Programme (‘ExCom’). States are responsible to ensure that their 
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st
 meeting, 
31 May 2011 [22]. 
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 Vincent Chetail argues that at least ‘some kind of identification process’ in RSD is needed to ensure 
the effective implementation of the principle of non-refoulement. V Chetail, ‘Are refugee Rights 
Human Rights?’ in R Rubio-Marin (ed) Human Rights and Immigration (OUP 2014) 51-52.  
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 M Pallis, ‘The Operation of UNHCR’s Accountability Mechanisms’ (2005) 37 IL&P 869, 880 
argues that when the rule of non-refoulement is combined with the ‘guarantee of effective legal 
protection —a general principle of law—the RSD obligation is created: an obligation to conduct 
refugee status determination in a manner which provides effective legal protection against 
the possibility of refoulement or denial of rights due under the refugee convention.’ 
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  In view of the nature of the risks involved and the grave consequences of an erroneous 
determination, it is essential that asylum-seekers be afforded full procedural safeguards and 
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UNHCR, ‘Fair and efficient asylum procedures: a non-exhaustive overview of applicable international 
standards’ 2 September 2005, 1. 
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RSD procedures are ‘fair and efficient or expeditious’
145
 or ‘fair and effective’.
146
 In a 
report on fair and efficient asylum processes, UNHCR stated that:  
Fair and efficient procedures are an essential element in the full and inclusive 
application of the Convention. They enable a State to identify those who should 




The ExCom has also acknowledged the link between international protection and the 
need for ‘fair and efficient’ procedures by emphasising: 
[T]he importance of establishing and ensuring access … to fair and efficient 
procedures for the determination of refugee status in order to ensure that refugees and 




The ExCom has also recognised a link between non-refoulement and ‘fair and 
effective’ procedures. The ExCom: 
Strongly deplores the continuing incidence and often tragic humanitarian 
consequences of refoulement in all its forms, including through summary removals, 
occasionally en masse, and reiterates in this regard the need to admit refugees to the 
territory of States, which includes no rejection at frontiers without access to fair and 
effective procedures for determining their status and protection needs.
149
 
It is argued that by virtue of relevant instruments, case law, UNGA resolutions and 
UNHCR/ExCom policy, there is a minimum requirement for RSD to be fair, efficient 
and effective, which is linked to non-refoulement in such a way as to be inextricable 
from it.
150
 Each of these elements will be considered in turn. 
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If RSD procedures are not effective they are not achieving their purpose. RSD 
procedures are created to carry out the legal obligation to not refoule an individual 
and it follows that to not be effective in this context is to commit a legal error. If a 
State commits a legal error by failing to recognise the refugee status of an individual 




Erika Feller, UNHCR’s then Assistant High Commissioner of Protection, has claimed 
that the core elements for an effective RSD system include  
(i) a single, specialized first instance body with qualified decision-makers, 
trained and supported with country of origin information;  
(ii) adequate resources to ensure efficiency, to identify those in need of 
protection quickly and to curb abuse;  
(iii) an appeal to an authority different from and independent of that making 
the initial decision; and  
(iv) a single process to deal with both refugee status and complementary forms 
of protection. 
152 
What ‘effective’ means in the context of refugee-related decisions has been 
considered by the ECtHR in regards to the requirements for an ‘effective remedy’, as 




In Chahal v United Kingdom, a case where 
the applicant, who was a Sikh, was facing deportation from the UK to India for 
national security reasons, the ECtHR found that an effective remedy requires 
‘independent scrutiny of the claim that there exist substantial grounds for fearing a 
real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3…’
154
 UNHCR has also stated that an 
effective remedy is a ‘second instance’ appeal where law and fact are considered (i.e. 
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 Considering UNHCR and judicial opinion together, effectiveness 
in RSD can be perceived as the resources, expertise and availability of first instance 
decision making and independent review to ensure legally correct determinations. 
The term efficiency is not given a general meaning in UNHCR or ExCom 
documentation, but is often used interchangeably or in conjunction with the need for 
expeditious decision making.
156
 Expeditious decision making, or the right to RSD 
‘without unreasonable delay’ has been argued to be an element of due process that is 
sourced from articles 6-11 of the UDHR and articles 13-14 of the ICCPR.
157
 
Considering Erika Feller has stated that ‘adequate resources to ensure efficiency’ is 
part of an effective RSD system,
158
 efficiency within the RSD context can be taken to 
mean the efficient allocation and use of resources, as well as the expectation that RSD 
procedures are performed expeditiously.  
Fairness is an elusive concept because it is both contextual and multi-faceted. Rather 
than being understood as encompassing ideals of democracy or good governance, 
fairness within the context of administrative decision making takes on a narrower 
‘procedural-type’ meaning to stand for concepts of procedural fairness, natural justice 
or due process.
159
   
The most fundamental element of fairness is an impartial and independent hearing, 
which is required by article 14(1) of the ICCPR. In A v Australia, the Australian 
government challenged an argument that RSD could be subject to article 14(1) by 
arguing that proceedings relating to refugee status do not deal with civil rights or 
obligations and that the decision to allow entry into its territory is a matter for the 
State concerned. Whilst not making a finding that RSD is always subject to the 
procedural standards set out in article 14(1), the HRC left the matter open by finding 
that:  
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The issue whether the proceedings … fall within the scope of article 14, paragraph 1, 
is a question which should be considered on its merits.
160
 
UNHCR and ExCom have also identified
161
 an impartial or independent review as 
being integral to a fair RSD system.
162
 Other elements of procedurally fair RSD that 
they identified are access to information,
163
 access to an interpreter,
164
 an opportunity 
to adequately present a case
165
 and a reasonable time to lodge an appeal. 
166
 
UNHCR, like States, must ensure that its RSD practices are fair, efficient and 
effective in order to be compliant with its non-refoulement obligations. UNHCR is 
bound to respect non-refoulement as customary international law, and because it is a 
subsidiary organ of the UN. Like States, when UNHCR conducts RSD it is obligated 
to respect non-refoulement, and like States, this requires the adoption of procedural 
standards that are fair, effective and efficient in accordance with relevant instruments, 
case law, UNGA resolutions, UNHCR policy
167
 and ExCom Conclusions.
168
 In 
UNHCR's own words ‘The main elements [of due process applicable to governments] 
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plen mtg (18 December 961) [1]) and (b) UNHCR consistently follows the advice of the ExCom 
(Lewis (n 74) 80), indicates the significant weight ExCom Conclusions hold for UNHCR. Where the 
ExCom Conclusions relate to the procedural standards of RSD, they apply to UNHCR because RSD is 
a function of UNHCR. 
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IV CONCLUSION 
States have both the ultimate responsibility for international protection and the ability 
to prevent UNHCR from achieving its own mandate by refusing access to refugees in 
its territory. Ideally, UNHCR’s role in camp administration and RSD would be 
decreased through greater State responsibility and burden sharing via increased 
funding and raised quotas for refugee intake. A State-backed and funded mechanism 
for review of UNHCR RSD is urgently needed. An independent and impartial review 
mechanism, whatever its form, will provide asylum seekers with an effective remedy 
that will enable an independent arbiter to decide whether the procedural standards of 
‘fairness, efficiency and effectiveness’ are being met, and fundamentally, guard 
against non-refoulement. 
However, as long as UNHCR engages in camp administration and RSD, it is 
imperative that it retains limited human rights obligations that exist alongside of, and 
not in substitution for, those of States.  The difficulty with this proposition, however, 
is the lack of remedies available for individuals who seek to hold IO's, including 
UNHCR, accountable for human rights abuse. If a breach of UNHCR’s human rights 
obligations could be classified as an ‘internationally wrongful act’, Part III of ARIO, 
which sets out the content of international responsibility of IOs, limits its scope to 
States, other IOs or to the ‘international community as a whole’.
170
 Part IV excludes 
individuals from invoking responsibility against an IO.
171
 Although article 33(1) is 
without prejudice to individuals who wish to challenge responsibility in an alternative 
forum such as a domestic court,
 172
 the ability to do so is limited by the doctrine of IO 
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 The difficulty of seeking redress for human rights abuse does not, 
however, remove the capacity to hold human rights obligations in the first place. 
 
Although UNHCR’s primary role remains international protection facilitated through 
State collaboration, its direct interaction with vulnerable individuals renders any 
suggestion that UNHCR has no obligation to protect their human rights as untenable. 
When UNHCR’s implied powers are considered with its capacity to hold human 
rights obligations, which comes from its position as a subsidiary organ of the UN and 
from general principles of international law, accountability is created for UNHCR to 
protect the human rights of refugees in certain circumstances. In particular, UNHCR's 
implied powers of administering refugee camps creates an obligation to respect, 
protect and fulfil the human rights of refugees who reside within those camps. Finally, 
UNHCR's implied power to conduct RSD creates an obligation for it to ensure that its 
RSD procedures are fair, efficient and effective as a means of acting as a bulwark 
against non-refoulement. 
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 In the recent case of Georges et al v United Nations, heard in the New York District Court, a group 
of Haitian residents lodged a class action against the UN for liability for the 2010 cholera outbreak that 
killed thousands and injured many more. Although the UN denied culpability for the outbreak, it is 
commonly accepted that the cause was inadequate sanitation in a camp used by Nepalese peacekeepers.  
The court found that as UN refused to expressly waive its immunity, it was immune from suit. Any 
alleged inadequacy of the UN's failure to offer an alternative mode of settlement, such as settling the 
private law claim or establishing a Standing Claims Commission, did not undermine the requirement 
for express waiver.  
Georges et al suggests a shy potential for a reinterpretation of section 29(a) of the Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (‘Convention on Immunities’) (1 UNTS 15. Applies to 
UNHCR as a subsidiary organ), which states that ‘[t]he United Nations shall make provisions for 
appropriate modes of settlement of … disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of a private 
law character to which the United Nations is a party.’ The court acknowledged that the word shall ‘is 
more than merely aspirational’ and that ‘it is obligatory and perhaps enforceable.’ Although the court 
found that section 29 could not override the clear and specific grant of immunity in section 2, it may be 
that a court willing to take a more teleological approach would render an interpretation of section 29 a 
necessary precondition to the grant of immunity, in accordance with the object and purpose (Vienna 
Convention (n 10) art 31(1))  of the Convention on Immunities, which was, after all, to ensure 
independence of the UN from its members (D Sarooshi, ‘The Powers of the United Nations Criminal 
Tribunals’ in J. A. Frowein and R Wolfru (eds) Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Volume 2 
(Kluwer Law International 1998) 141, 191) and not immunity from the suit of individuals. 
